I analyze the relationship between economics and politics across eight parliamentary elections in four transition countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. I argue that support for reform reflects the balance between positive and negative effects of the reform. Accordingly, I identify economic groups that support or oppose the reform. The former are private entrepreneurs, white collar workers and university educated voters. The latter are the unemployed, retirees, and blue collar and agricultural workers. This general pattern holds both within countries and across countries, and across tenures of different governments. In contrast with the responsibility hypothesis, voters in the transition countries are found to be forward looking, not retrospective.
Introduction
Political development in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) reveals a peculiar pattern: The collapse of communism occurred amidst overwhelming popular support for fundamental economic and political reforms. However, only a few years later the pendulum swung back and the reformers were voted out. Instead, the voters turned towards parties that challenged radical economic transition -ex-communists, social democrats, and nationalists.
1 In this paper, I attempt to explain the deterioration of support for reforms, by pointing out to the differences in adverse effects of reforms -both across countries as well as within countries. I argue that the economic effects of reforms -such as unemployment and growth of a new private sector -determine the political support for parties associated with implementing the reforms. To capture this effect, I construct a unique data set containing regional (county level) election results and economic data for the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia. I analyze the link between the former and the latter by regressing the regional election results on selected socio-economic indicators.
This paper seeks to contribute to two distinct streams in the economic literature: political sustainability of reform, and voting/popularity functions. The former analyzes the relationship between adverse effects of reform and its political sustainability. An early example is Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) who discuss the role played by individual uncertainty about the distribution of winners and losers. Others, for example Agion and Blanchard (1995) , Blanchard (1997) , and Fidrmuc (1998) , emphasize the role played by excessive unemployment.
2
Voting and popularity functions (VP-functions) bring together economics and political science. Typically, empirical results indicate that the voters hold the current government responsible for state of the economy. 3 I explore the interactions between economics and politics in the specific context of political and economic transition in CEE. I argue that instead of punishing or rewarding the government for economic performance, elections in the transition countries serve as referenda on the speed of reforms, and the overall reform strategy.
The contribution of this paper should also be seen in presenting the most comprehensive analysis of voting in transition countries so far (covering four nations and eight elections), and presenting results that are comparable across countries. 4 In the next section, I introduce the data set I used, and present the results of the empirical analysis. I then discuss the results and offer some concluding remarks in the last section.
Empirical Analysis
Essentially, the objective of my paper is to explain the recent political developments in the transition countries of CEE by linking them to the underlying economic processes. The basic idea is that the voters' decisions are affected by the state of the economy at the moment of the election, and/or their expectations of future economic developments. The process of economic reform has played a fundamental role in determining the current state of the economy.
Therefore, I seek to identify the relationship between voters' support for economic reforms, and election outcomes.
5
Typically, the links between economics and elections are studied using time-series data. Table 1 for election results):
• Czech Republic: the Chamber of Deputies (lower house), 1992 and 1996, both resulting in reelection of pro-reform government;
• Hungary: the Parliament (those seats that were awarded by proportional vote), 1994
(transition from right wing to post-communist dominated government) and 1998
(transition from post-communists to right wing);
3 Nannestad and Paldam (1994) present an extensive survey of this literature; Paldam (1991) analyzes the robustness of this relationship. 4 Other, mainly single country analyses, are Munich and Sorm (1995) for Czech and Slovak elections in 1992, Jackson et al. (1996) and Bell (1997) for Polish 1993 election, and Pacek (1994) covering Bulgaria in 1991 , Poland in 1991 , and Czechoslovakia in 1992 . Earle et al. (1997 and Mateju and Rehakova (1996) , analyze opinion-poll data from the Czech Republic. Finally, Lafay (1981) analyzes the relationship between economics and politics under communist regime in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania during 1960's and 1970's. 5 From the point of view of this analysis, it is important whether a particular party was perceived as proreform or anti-reform prior to the election. As it turned out, ex-communists in Hungary and Poland continued in reforms ex post even though they appeared opposed to radical reforms ex ante.
6 See, for example, Fair (1978 , 1996 ), and Paldam (1991 . 7 Application of this approach has been rather limited so far -an exception is Rattinger (1991).
• Poland: the Sejm (lower house), 1993 (transition from right wing to post-communist dominated government) and 1997 (transition from post-communists to right wing), and the presidential election in 1995;
• Slovakia: the National Council, 1992 (transition from pro-reform government to a nationalist one) and 1994 (transition from pro-reform government 8 to one dominated by nationalists).
I focus on the second and subsequent elections after the collapse of the communist regime.
The first post-communists elections are not included because they took place before the process of economic reforms started, and it is unlikely that reform-related issues played a role.
Instead, the first free elections appeared to be dominated by the post-communist euphoria rather than economic issues. To explain the regional differences in patterns of political support, I regressed the electoral results of individual parties on a set of economic and demographic variables (see Table 2 ). To ensure comparability, I tried to use the same set of explanatory variables for all countries and elections. The following economic indicators were used: the unemployment rate, the average wage, the number of small individual entrepreneurs and self-employed (as percentage of population, excluding farmers), and the share of employment in industry and agriculture.
Demographic indicators included were the (logarithm of) population density, and the proportions of population in the following categories: post-productive age (retirement age as determined by the national standards 9 ), university educated (not available for Hungary), Roman Catholics (not available for Hungary and Poland), and national minorities (Moravian in the Czech Republic, and Hungarian and Roma in Slovakia). 10 The variables used were generally end-of-year values of the election year, except for wages, which were the average 8 The nationalist government elected in 1992 was dismissed in March 1994, and replaced with a grand coalition of the remaining parties. The nationalists regained office in September 1994.
9 Differences in national limits for retirement explain the low figure for Poland in Table 2 . 10 Bohemia and Moravia are the two parts of the Czech Republic. Although Czech is spoken in both parts, 16% of Czech citizens reported Moravian nationality in the 1991census. Hungarians, making up 11 % of Slovak population, are mainly concentrated in regions along the Hungarian border. It is estimated that Roma make up between 3-8% of Slovak population.
values of the election year.
11 The statistics reveal a rather uneven regional distribution of costs and benefits of reforms (see Table 2 ). Unemployment rate is lower and wages are higher in some regions, especially urban areas, while rural areas are often stricken with extremely high unemployment and low wages. Other variables show substantial regional differences as well.
Voting results also vary substantially from region to region (see the information on election results in the bottom panels of Tables 3 through 10 ).
The estimated equation has the following form:
where Vt,j stands for the share of votes received by party j in period t; Xi,t are the explanatory economic and demographic variables, and εt,j is the error term. The full list of regressors includes between nine and twelve variables while the sample sizes are between 20 and 76. To reduce the degrees-of-freedom problem, I first ran the regressions with the full list of explanatory variables. Then, I stepwise eliminated the variables that were not even marginally significant (in general, with t-statistics below one), starting with the least significant ones and continuing until the adjusted R 2 was maximized. Clearly, parties differ with respect to the policies they advocate and the social and/or economic groups they appeal to. Hence, it is obvious that different variables will be significant for different parties.
The estimation was performed by the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method.
With SUR, regression equations for all parties participating in an election are estimated jointly, with equations being linked by their disturbances. 12 Allowing the error terms εt,j to be correlated across parties indirectly implements the adding up contstraint -the parties together cannot receive more than 100% of the votes, and hence higher support for one party in a region must also imply lower support for the other parties.
The results of individual-election regressions are reported in Tables 3-10. The Tables list the parties according to their position along the political spectrum -starting with the right wing pro-reform parties, then the left wing parties, and finally the nationalist and extremist parties, and parties representing national minorities.
Clearly, economics played an important role in shaping the political developments in the transition countries. From the results listed in the Tables, one can observe the general patterns 11 There were a few exception to this rule: demographic data were not available on a yearly basis and the nearest available year was used. In addition, in a few cases where a particular variable was not available for the election year, the year preceding the election was used.
12 See Greene (1997, pp. 674-676).
of voting behavior of individual social and/or economic groups. In contrast with the typical finding in the literature on voting and popularity functions (see Nannestad and Paldam (1994) ), incumbency status of parties does not appear to play an important role. The 'responsibility hypothesis' implies that the voters hold the government responsible for the state of the economy. Accordingly then, the regions with low unemployment should display lower support for the government, regardless of its political orientation. This is not the case in CEE.
On the contrary, the patterns of support are quite stable, and do not change much when a party moves from the opposition to the government, or vice versa.
Voting behavior in the transition countries thus appears to be essentially forward looking, not retrospective. Voters support parties, which they expect to deliver policies favorable to them. In summary, support for the pro-reform right wing parties is thus negatively related to unemployment, positively to the measure of private entrepreneurial activity, urban population (reflected by population density), and share of voters with university education. Proportion of retirees in the region's population is negatively related to the support for pro-reform parties, except in the Czech Republic. Support for the left wing parties, on the other hand, is positively correlated with unemployment and share of population in retirement age (again with the exception of the Czech Republic). It is negatively related to the measure of private entrepreneurial activity, population density, and share of voters with university education.
Finally, the pattern of support for nationalists and extremist seems rather hard to identify using the variables included in the estimation.
Unemployment
Unemployment has been the most acute consequence of economic transition in CEE. From virtually zero, the unemployment rate shot up to in excess of ten percent in most countries.
Regression results indicate that unemployment generally reduces support for parties associated with economic reforms, and increases support for post-communist and other left wing parties.
The effect of unemployment is quite strong and most cases statistically significant. 
Sectoral Reallocation
Economic transition has caused substantial reallocations among sectors. Typically, firms operating in the service sector benefited from the reforms whereas industrial and agricultural enterprises often experienced severe problems. To capture the sector-specific effects, I
included the share of employment in industry and agriculture in the regressions. Industrial and agricultural employees are typically blue collar workers. One can expect that they have benefited less from the transition compared to white-collar workers, and therefore will be more likely to support parties challenging reforms. Indeed, industrial employment in general increases support for some left-wing and nationalist parties, and reduces support for proreform parties. However, compared to the economic variables discussed above, this relationship is less consistent across parties and different elections. Similarly, agricultural employment seems to negatively affect the pro-reform parties and benefit left-wing parties.
Moreover, agricultural employment is positively correlated with support for those parties that cater specifically to the interests of this sector. This is, for example, the case of KDU-CSL in the Czech Republic, FKgP in Hungary, and PSL in Poland.
Wages
Finally, with the inclusion of average wages I intended to capture the uneven distribution of benefits of the reforms in terms of income. One can expect that high wages will increase support for reforms, when controlling for other potential factors (unemployment, entrepreneurial activity).
However, it is rather hard to identify a clear pattern in the relationship between support for reforms and wages. This is perhaps because the effect usually attributed to wages in the voting and popularity literature is already captured here by the other economic variables. 
Demographic Factors
Demographics should naturally have an effect on voters' preferences. The retirees have been hit disproportionately by the adverse effects of reform. Arguably, they can be expected to have different preferences regarding radical reforms than the younger population. The log of population density is intended to serve as proxy for the urbanization of the region. The higher 15 Opinion polls usually suggest that right wing parties in CEE derive support from individuals with higher incomes. These are typically entrepreneurs, white collar workers, and highly educated people -these economic groups are already controlled for in the regressions. the population density, the greater in general the share of region's population living in towns. 
Conclusions
The empirical results presented above indicate that there is indeed a strong relationship between economic developments and voting behavior in the transition countries. Uneven distribution of benefits and costs of reform creates winners and losers, and thus constituencies supporting or opposing radical economic reform. Consequently, it is the balance between positive and adverse effects of the reforms that underlies the differences in political development across transition countries, rather than differences in history, culture, or the extent of post-communist legacy. The same general pattern of interactions between economics and politics holds within as well as across the four countries analyzed. The pattern of support is also remarkably stable over the tenures of different governments. This is particularly evident from the estimates pertaining to the 1997 election in Poland and 1998 election in Hungary, where the unemployed (and retirees in Poland) supported the incumbent left wing parties and opposed the pro-reform challengers. This stands in stark contrast with the prevailing result obtained by scholars studying voting and popularity functions in developed countries, namely that "incumbents benefit from an expanding economy and challengers thrive on misery." 16 .
The result indicating stable patterns of support has an intriguing implication for party politics in transition: we should see right wing parties concerned about combating unemployment whereas left wing parties can get away with implementing harsh austerity measures and privatizing state-owned enterprises. As Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) 
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